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1 Introduction
There has been a growing realization that environmental degradation has
serious socio-economic implications for the present and future generations.
This realization has sparked an explosion of interest in environmental eco-
nomics, in particular the role of regulation in controlling environmental
degradation. In this paper we seek to explore the interlinkages between
environmental regulation and market structure.
In the analysis of environmental policy, the assumption of a competitive
product market is the most common one.1 Though there is some literature
which assumes that the product market is monopolistic,2 until recently much
less attention has been given to the case of oligopoly.3
Most of the literature with an oligopolistic market structure, however,
assumes that the market structure is exogenously given. While this is a
reasonable assumption in some contexts, under some scenarios, however, it
may be more reasonable to assume that the market structure is endogenous.
For example, we shall focus on the case where the firms endogenously decide
whether to operate competitively, or opt for merger.4 In that case we would
like to argue that policy conclusions that hold with an exogenously given
market structure, need not hold when the market structure is endogenous.
In this paper we seek to examine the effect of environmental policy on
the incentive for mergers in dirty industries, and the consequent effect on
pollution.
Mergers, of course, are an important business phenomenon.5 Some level
1See, among others, Baumol and Oates (1998).
2See, for example, Buchanan (1969).
3See, among others, Carraro and Soubeyran (1996).
4Another scenario could be where entry is free and firms endogenously decide whether
to enter the market or not.
5As Martin (1993) argues, policy makers have great faith in the efficiency enhancing
effect of mergers. He quotes the 1984 US Department of Justice Merger Guidelines and
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of activity in the merger market is always visible, even in less developed
countries.6 Moreover, mergers are often active in large businesses involv-
ing dirty products.7 Given this fact, we feel that studying the interaction
between mergers and environmental policy is of some importance. In our
model the endogeneity of the market structure arises since whether a merger
takes place or not is decided by the firms themselves.
We develop a theory of mergers based on synergy. Mergers are often
said to be motivated by synergy whereby one partner is efficient in some
aspects, whereas the other partner is efficient in other aspects.8 Thus, in
case of merger, the partner firms can access each others strengths, leading
to a synergistic reduction in costs.9
Thus merger has two advantages over Cournot competition. First, there
is the gain due to synergy, and second, by merging, the firms can avoid the
dissipation of rents. However, merger involves some fixed costs as well. This
can be attributed to two main reasons, cultural and organizational differ-
ences between the two firms and the fact that a merger may be contested.
Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects there can be either
joint venture formation, or Cournot competition.
The nature of merger costs have important implications for our anal-
ysis. Suppose that merger costs are primarily due to cultural differences.
other sources in this context. Of course, whether mergers are actually beneficial from a
social point of view is a widely debated issue.
6See, among others, Jacquemin (1990) and Roy (1997).
7For a list of firms involved in mergers in the Indian market in 2000-2001, we refer the
readers to http://www/indiainfoline.com/stok/meam/mg19.html. Even a causal perusal
of this list suggests that many of these mergers took place among firms in dirty industries.
8In the Indian context, for example, the merger between Reliance Petroleum and Re-
liance Industries is said to be fuelled by such synergies (see Srinivasan (2002)).
9Theoretically, allowing for such synergies allows one to get around the problems dis-
cussed in Salant et al. (1983). An alternative approach, based on capital agglomeration
in the merged firm, was developed by Perry and Porter (1985).
2
The analytical implication is that in that case merger costs are likely to
be independent of the level of environmental policy.10 Next consider the
case where merger costs arise because its contested. In case of mergers (or
acquisitions) there are often important organizational changes post-merger.
In fact, in certain cases the incumbent management of the firms may be
removed. Thus, in the face of such threats, mergers are likely to be con-
tested by the management (as well as other stake-holders interested in the
continuation of independent Cournot firms). Contesting mergers, however,
are costly.11 In case the merger still goes through, these costs have to be
borne by the merged firms. Note that in such a scenario merger costs are
likely to be increasing in the Cournot profits (and thus on environmental
policy). This is because in case Cournot profits are large, the managers and
other stake-holders have a greater interest in preventing a merger and are
likely to contest the merger much more vigorously.
We examine a dirty industry where production leads to pollution, the
level of pollution being monotonically related to the level of output. The
government uses several policy measures (e.g. imposing emission taxes etc.)
so as to control the level of pollution. All these policy measures create an
abatement cost for the firms. Clearly the stricter the governmental policy,
the higher is the abatement cost.
We then briefly summarize our main results.
We first consider the case where the merger costs arise because of the
merger being contested. In this case we find that an increase in abatement
costs may lead to a regime switch from Cournot competition to merger.
10In a different context Kabiraj et al. (2001) use cultural differences to explain joint
venture breakdown.
11These involve various components, contacting the share-holders, informing them re-
garding the potential problems in case a merger goes through, researching the other firm,
arranging for board-meetings etc.
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Moreover, in case the synergistic effect is large, this may cause the level of
pollution to increase.
We then consider the case where merger costs arise because of cultural
and organizational differences between the two firms. In this case we demon-
strate that an increase in abatement costs may lead to a regime switch from
merger to Cournot competition. Moreover, in case the synergistic effect is
small, this may cause the level of pollution to increase.
Thus we demonstrate that an increase in abatement costs may lead to
regime switches in the concerned market. Interestingly, the exact nature
of the regime switch depends on the nature of merger costs. The regime
switch result is of interest by itself since, in a study of the first 200 For-
tune 500 companies, Zanetti and Abate (1993), argue that in industrialized
countries big corporations often respond to environmental policy through
organizational innovations.
Moreover, we find that there exist parameter values such that an increase
in abatement taxes may cause the pollution level to increase. We find that
this is true irrespective of the nature of merger costs.
The above finding corroborates our contention that when the market
structure is endogenous, environmental policy may have some non-obvious
effects on the level of pollution. Moreover, there is some evidence that
even very high level of abatement taxes may fail to reduce pollution levels
sufficiently.12 Our analysis suggests that one possible explanation could be
that such high level of abatement taxes causes a regime-switch to a more
polluting market structure.
We then briefly relate our work in this paper to the existing literature.
12For example, evidence presented by the European Commission regarding the European
carbon tax, based on research carried out by several research institutes, suggest that even
a very high carbon tax achieves only half of the required reduction target. See, Carraro
and Siniscalco (1994).
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First consider the case where the market structure is exogenously given.
In an n-firm Cournot framework, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996), show
that an increase in emission tax decreases the output level and increases
abatement expenses. Moreover, the optimal tax is less than marginal dam-
ages. Conrad and Wang (1993) solves for the effects of the emission tax on
the output of an oligopolistic industry. In contrast to the above models, Car-
raro and Soubeyran ( 1996), Ulph (1996a) and Ulph (1996b), among others,
examine the impact of emission taxes when the firms are heterogenous.
Next consider the case where the market structure is endogenous. In
a homogeneous product industry with free entry, Katsoulacos and Xepa-
padeas (1995) show that the optimal emission tax may exceed marginal
environmental damages. Clearly, the framework adopted by Katsoulacos
and Xepapadeas (1995) is very different from that in our paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
describe the basic framework. Section 3 contains the main results. Finally,
section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The market comprises two firms, firm 1 and firm 2, producing a homogenous
product. The market demand function is given by
q = a− p, (1)
where a (> 0) is the parameter of market size.
For the i-th firm its production cost, Ci(qi), as well as its abatement cost,
Ai(qi), are linear in the level of output. Thus Ci(qi) = cqi and Ai(qi) = Aqi,
where A is the initial abatement cost parameter. Note that the abatement
cost is a linear version of the abatement cost function used by Barrett (1994).
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Thus the total cost of the i-th firm is given by
cqi +Aqi, i = 1, 2. (2)
We consider a simple two stage game.
Stage 1. The firms sequentially decide whether to opt for Cournot com-
petition, or merger. There is merger if and only if both the forms opt for
it.
Stage 2. In case there is Cournot competition, the firms simultaneously
decide on their level of output. In case of a merger, the merged firm becomes
a monopoly that maximizes its own profits.
We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.
Merger. Under a merger the production cost of the merged firm is given
by c′q, where c′ < c. The assumption c′ < c reflects the fact that merger
leads to a synergy in the cost structure. Thus if c′ is small compared to c,
then we say that the synergistic effect is large. If c′ is close to c, then we
say that the synergistic effect is small.
Moreover, merger formation also involves a fixed cost F (A). This can
arise because of two main reasons, either cultural and organizational differ-
ences between the two firms and/or the fact that a merger may be contested.
In case of mergers, the existing managers are often replaced by new ones.
Thus the managers are likely to oppose a merger in case such replacement
is likely. Since this is done using the resources of the firms themselves,
contesting a merger involves some costs for the parent firms.
As we shall see later, the nature of merger costs play a crucial role in
the analysis.
We assume that the profits under merger (net of merger costs F (A)) is
equally divided among the two firms. Let Mi(q) denote the profit level of
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the i-th firm under merger. Then
Mi(q) =
1
2
[a− c′q −Aq − F (A)]. (3)
Letting qˆ denote the equilibrium level of aggregate output
qˆ =
a− c′ −A
2
. (4)
Thus the equilibrium level of profit of both the firms
M̂ =
(a− c′ −A)2
8
− F (A)
2
. (5)
Cournot Competition. We then examine the outcome under Cournot
competition. Letting Pi(q1, q2) denote the profit function of the i-th firm
under Cournot competition
Pi(q1, q2) = (a− q1 − q2)qi − cqi −Aqi, i = 1, 2. (6)
Thus the reaction functions are given by
∂Pi(q1, q2)
∂qi
= (a− qi − qj)− qi − c−A = 0, i = 1, 2. (7)
Let qi denote the equilibrium output level of the i-th firm. It is standard to
show that in equilibrium q1 = q2. Hence
q1 = q2 = q =
a− c−A
3
. (8)
The equilibrium profit level of each Cournot firm
P =
1
9
(a− c−A)2. (9)
From equations (4) and (8) we have the following
Observation. Consider a scenario where the market structure is exoge-
nously given. Under both merger and Cournot competition, the equilibrium
level of aggregate output, and hence pollution, are decreasing in A.
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3 The Analysis
In this section we examine the effect of an increase in the abatement cost
parameter from A to A′ on market structure, as well as the level of pollution.
Depending on the nature of merger costs there are two cases to consider.
3.1 Merger costs arising because the merger is contested
In this sub-section we focus on the extreme case where merger costs arise
because the merger is contested. For expositional simplicity, in this sub-
section we assume that there are no organizational, or cultural costs of a
merger.
As argued earlier, in such a situation mergers are likely to be more
bitterly contested greater the Cournot profit levels. This is because when
the Cournot profits are high, then the existing managers have a greater stake
in the mergers and are likely to contest the merger vigorously. Thus in this
case merger costs are increasing in the level of Cournot profits.
To begin with we examine whether under the existing level of abatement
cost A, there is going to be merger or Cournot competition. Suppose that
A is not too large to begin with i.e.
a > c+A > c′ +A, (10)
so that Cournot competition is feasible (merger is also feasible provided
F (A) is not too large). We then assume that merger costs are reasonably
large in the sense that
F (A)
2
>
(a− c′ −A)2
8
− (a− c−A)
2
9
. (11)
Thus initially there will be Cournot competition.
We consider the effect of an increase in abatement costs to A′ (> A).
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For simplicity we assume that
c+A′ > a > c′ +A′. (12)
Note that in this case Cournot competition is not feasible (since c+A′ >
a). Thus in this case we assume that the fixed cost of merger is zero, i.e.
F (A′) = 0, since neither of the firms want to contest the merger. Thus
merger will take place (since a > c′ + A′) and the profit level of both the
firms under merger is
(a− c′ −A′)2
8
, (13)
and the aggregate output level is
(a− c′ −A′)
2
. (14)
Thus in this case an increase in A causes a regime switch from Cournot
competition to merger.
Summarizing the above discussion we obtain our first proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that (i) a > c + A > c′ + A, (ii) F (A)2 >
(a−c′−A)2
8 − (a−c−A)
2
9 , (iii) c + A
′ > a > c′ + A′ and (iv) F (A′) = 0. Then
an increase in the abatement cost from A to A′ causes a regime switch from
Cournot competition to mergers.
We then compare the level of pollution under merger and Cournot com-
petition. Since the level of pollution is monotonically related to the level of
output, it is sufficient to compare the aggregate output level under merger
and Cournot competition.
From equations (8) and (14), the aggregate output (and hence the pol-
lution level) increases after the shift in abatement cost to A′ if and only
if
c′ < a−A′ − 4(a− c−A)
3
. (15)
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Summarizing the above discussion we obtain our next proposition.
Proposition 2. The pollution level when there is merger and the abate-
ment cost is A′, exceeds that under Cournot competition when the abatement
cost is A, if and only if c′ < a−A′ − 4(a−c−A)3 .
There are three effects at work here. As A increases to A′, pollution
is likely to decrease since the industry moves from duopoly to monopoly,
and since, under any given market structure, the abatement cost increases.
However, the pollution level is likely to increase because of the synergistic
effect. The condition that c′ < a−A′− 4(a−c−A)3 essentially ensures that the
synergistic effect is large enough, i.e. c′ is small enough, for this to happen.
From Propositions 1 and 2 we obtain Corollary 1, the main result of this
sub-section.
Corollary 1. Suppose that (i) a > c+A > c′+A, (ii) F (A)2 >
(a−c′−A)2
8 −
(a−c−A)2
9 , (iii) c + A
′ > a > c′ + A′, (iv) F (A′) = 0 and (v) c′ < a − A′ −
4(a−c−A)
3 . Then an increase in the abatement cost from A to A
′ causes a
regime switch from Cournot competition to mergers. Moreover, there is an
increase in the level of pollution.
The following example shows that the above corollary is not vacuous.
Example 1. Let a = 10, c = 4, c′ = 0, A = 4, A′ = 7 and F (A) = 759 .
Note that in this case all the hypotheses of Corollary 1 are satisfied.
3.2 Merger costs arising out of cultural and organizational
differences
In this sub-section we focus on the case where the merger costs arise because
of cultural and organizational differences. For expositional ease in this sub-
section we assume that mergers are never contested at all.
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In this scenario the merger cost is clearly independent of the abatement
cost. Thus F (A) = F, ∀A.
Let us consider the incentive for merger formation I(A), where I(A)
denotes the difference in profit level between individual firms under merger
and Cournot competition. Thus
I(A) =
(a− c′ −A)2
8
− F
2
− (a− c−A)
2
9
. (16)
Straightforward calculations demonstrate that dIdA < 0.
13 Thus for any A′ >
A, there exists F such that I(A′) < 0 < I(A). Hence in this case there will
be merger when the abatement cost is A, and there is Cournot competition
when the abatement cost is A′.
Summarizing the above discussion we obtain our next proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose F (A) = F, ∀A. For any A′ > A, there exists
F such that there is merger when the abatement cost is A, and there is
Cournot competition when the abatement cost is A′.
Note that in this case a regime switch from Cournot competition to
merger is triggered by a decrease in the abatement tax. This result is the
exact opposite to that of Proposition 1. Thus Propositions 1 and 3 together
show that the nature of the regime switch in our model is critically dependent
on the nature of merger costs.
We then examine if an increase in A can cause the level of pollution to
increase or not.
Combining Propositions 2 and 3, we obtain our final result.
13Note that
dI(A)
da
=
−(a− c−A)− 9(c− c′)
36
.
Since Cournot competition is feasible, we have that a− c− A > 0. Moreover, because of
synergy, c > c′. Hence the claim follows.
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Corollary 2. Suppose that I(A′) < 0 < I(A) and c′ > a−A′− 4(a−c−A)3 .
Then an increase in abatement costs from A to A′ causes a regime switch
from merger to Cournot competition. Moreover, this causes an increase in
the level of pollution.
The intuition is straightforward. With an increase in abatement costs
there is a regime switch from mergers to Cournot competition. Given that
the synergistic effect is small, the level of output, and hence pollution in-
creases as a result.
The following example shows that the above corollary is not vacuous.
Example 2. Let a = 10, c = 4, c′ = 3, A = 4, A′ = 6. Note that
we can always find appropriate values of F such that all the hypotheses of
Corollary 2 are satisfied.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the effect of environmental policy in a duopoly
structure where the firms endogenously decide whether to opt for Cournot
competition, or merger. We demonstrate that an increase in abatement
costs may lead to regime switches from Cournot competition to merger, or
the other way round. Interestingly, the exact nature of the regime switch
depends on the nature of merger costs. In case the merger costs arise because
mergers are contested, we find that an increase in abatement costs causes
a regime switch from Cournot competition to mergers. Whereas if merger
costs are due to cultural differences, an increase in abatement costs may
lead to a regime switch from merger to Cournot competition.
Moreover, we find that there exist parameter configurations such that
an increase in abatement taxes may cause the pollution level to increase.
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We find that this is true irrespective of the nature of merger costs. The
above finding corroborates our contention that when the market structure
is endogenous, environmental policy may have some non-obvious effects on
the level of pollution.
From a policy point of view our analysis suggests that, while analyzing
the implications of environmental policy, the linkage between environmental
policy and market structure needs to be addressed seriously.
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